@gravity-ui/icons
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): Scoped @gravity-ui/icons is a legitimate icon library, not a typosquat of cors; Levenshtein match is spurious. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.18.0 | 1 / 40 | |
| 2.17.0 | 1 / 40 | |
| 2.16.0 | 1 / 40 | |
| 2.15.0 | 1 / 40 | |
| 2.14.0 | 0 / 38 |
v2.17.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.16.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.15.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.14.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.