@growthbook/growthbook-react
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established GrowthBook org package; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal for this well-known SDK. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.6.5 | 1 / 20 | |
| 1.6.4 | 1 / 20 | |
| 1.6.3 | 1 / 20 | |
| 1.6.2 | 1 / 19 | |
| 1.6.1 | 1 / 19 | |
| 1.6.0 | 1 / 19 | |
| 1.5.1 | 1 / 19 | |
| 1.5.0 | 1 / 19 |
v1.6.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.6.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.6.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.6.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.5.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.