@gscdump/db
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:pg | AI (typosquat): Scoped package @gscdump/db is a GSC data persistence tool, not a typosquat of pg. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:qs | AI (typosquat): Scoped package @gscdump/db is a GSC data persistence tool, not a typosquat of qs. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:google-auth-library | AI (phantom-deps): Dep used via drizzle/db config files rather than direct ESM imports; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@googleapis/searchconsole | AI (phantom-deps): Dep used via drizzle/db config files rather than direct ESM imports; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
v0.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.