@guanghechen/reporter
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Established publisher with strong track record; likely a CI/build environment change, not a supply chain concern. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@guanghechen/types | AI (dependencies): Same-namespace dep from the same author; consistent with the package's existing dependency pattern. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.3.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.2.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v3.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.2.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: lemonclown.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: lemonclown.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.