@guardian/stand
_Find what you need on the (news)stand!_
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/types/components/intended-audience-signifier/sandbox.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Long lines are JSX sandbox code embedded as string literals in a .d.ts declaration file — not obfuscation. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:react-dom | AI (phantom-deps): react-dom is declared as both a dependency and peer dependency; phantom-dep is a false positive here. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): Guardian monorepo initial publish pattern; 114 versions in registry confirms active org, not throwaway. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/types/components/menu/sandbox.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Long lines are embedded JSX/CSS strings in .d.ts sandbox demo files, not obfuscated malicious code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/types/components/icon-button/sandbox.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Same pattern: readable JSX/CSS strings in sandbox .d.ts files. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/types/components/button/sandbox.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Long lines are readable JSX/CSS strings embedded in .d.ts sandbox demo files, not obfuscated malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/types/components/icon-link-button/sandbox.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Same pattern: readable JSX/CSS strings in sandbox .d.ts files. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/types/components/link-button/sandbox.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Same pattern: readable JSX/CSS strings in sandbox .d.ts files. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/types/components/text-area/sandbox.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Same pattern: embedded sandbox code strings in TypeScript declaration files, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/types/components/alert-banner/sandbox.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Same pattern: embedded sandbox code strings in TypeScript declaration files, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/types/components/checkbox/CheckboxSandbox.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Long lines are embedded JSX/CSS string literals in .d.ts sandbox files, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/types/components/radio-group/sandbox.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Long lines are embedded JSX/CSS string literals in .d.ts sandbox files, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/types/components/checkbox/CheckboxGroupSandbox.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Long lines are embedded JSX/CSS string literals in .d.ts sandbox files, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:zustand | AI (typosquat): Legitimate @guardian org design system package; scoped namespace makes typosquatting implausible. | ai |
Versions (showing 44 of 44)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.44 | 0 / 51 | |
| 0.0.43 | 0 / 51 | |
| 0.0.42 | 0 / 51 | |
| 0.0.41 | 0 / 51 | |
| 0.0.40 | 0 / 54 | |
| 0.0.39 | 0 / 54 | |
| 0.0.38 | 0 / 54 | |
| 0.0.37 | 0 / 54 | |
| 0.0.36 | 0 / 54 | |
| 0.0.35 | 0 / 54 | |
| 0.0.34 | 0 / 54 | |
| 0.0.33 | 0 / 54 | |
| 0.0.32 | 0 / 52 | |
| 0.0.31 | 0 / 51 | |
| 0.0.30 | 0 / 51 | |
| 0.0.29 | 0 / 51 | |
| 0.0.28 | 0 / 51 | |
| 0.0.27 | 0 / 51 | |
| 0.0.26 | 0 / 51 | |
| 0.0.25 | 0 / 51 | |
| 0.0.24 | 0 / 51 | |
| 0.0.23 | 0 / 51 | |
| 0.0.22 | 0 / 51 | |
| 0.0.21 | 0 / 51 | |
| 0.0.20 | 0 / 52 | |
| 0.0.19 | 0 / 52 | |
| 0.0.18 | 0 / 52 | |
| 0.0.17 | 0 / 52 | |
| 0.0.16 | 0 / 53 | |
| 0.0.15 | 0 / 52 | |
| 0.0.14 | 0 / 51 | |
| 0.0.13 | 0 / 51 | |
| 0.0.12 | 0 / 50 | |
| 0.0.11 | 0 / 50 | |
| 0.0.10 | 0 / 50 | |
| 0.0.9 | 0 / 45 | |
| 0.0.8 | 0 / 45 | |
| 0.0.7 | 0 / 45 | |
| 0.0.6 | 0 / 44 | |
| 0.0.5 | 0 / 38 | |
| 0.0.4 | 0 / 38 | |
| 0.0.3 | 10 / 28 | |
| 0.0.2 | 10 / 29 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 9 |
v0.0.44
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.43
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.42
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.41
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.40
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.39
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.38
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.37
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.36
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.35
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.34
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.33
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.32
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.17
6 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.16
6 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.15
5 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.