@hanzogui/bento-get
> Install all the Bento suite of components through the CLI
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance is common (~88% of npm); no other risk signals present to elevate this. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:octokit | AI (phantom-deps): Declared runtime dep used indirectly via abstraction layers in a CLI tool; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:ink-link | AI (phantom-deps): Ink component likely imported dynamically or via JSX; stable false positive for this CLI package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:type-fest | AI (phantom-deps): Type-only dependency; not imported at runtime, phantom-dep is expected. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:copy-paste | AI (phantom-deps): Runtime dep in a CLI tool; indirect usage pattern is plausible, stable false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 7.0.0 | 19 / 4 | |
| 4.4.0 | 19 / 4 | |
| 4.3.1 | 19 / 4 | |
| 3.0.6 | 19 / 4 | |
| 3.0.5 | 19 / 4 | |
| 3.0.2 | 19 / 4 | |
| 3.0.1 | 19 / 4 | |
| 3.0.0 | 19 / 4 | |
| 2.0.5 | 19 / 4 | |
| 2.0.4 | 19 / 4 | |
| 2.0.3 | 19 / 4 | |
| 2.0.2 | 19 / 4 | |
| 2.0.1 | 19 / 4 | |
| 2.0.0 | 19 / 4 |
v3.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.