@hanzogui/dialog
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@hanzogui/polyfill-dev | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dev polyfill; likely used indirectly via build tooling. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@hanzogui/animate-presence | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep; likely re-exported or used conditionally. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Internal component lib; missing description is consistent across the org. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Signals are all metadata gaps typical for scoped internal component packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 7.0.0 | 18 / 3 | |
| 3.0.1 | 18 / 3 | |
| 2.0.7 | 18 / 3 | |
| 2.0.5 | 18 / 3 | |
| 2.0.0 | 18 / 3 |
v7.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.