@hapi/subtext
HTTP payload parsing
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): @hapi packages predate Sigstore provenance; stable false positive for this ecosystem. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 8.1.3 | 7 / 4 | |
| 8.1.2 | 7 / 4 | |
| 8.1.1 | 7 / 4 | |
| 8.1.0 | 7 / 4 | |
| 8.0.1 | 7 / 4 | |
| 8.0.0 | 7 / 4 |
v8.1.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (devinivy) than the most recent previously approved version (marsup) on 2023-02-14, but devinivy is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v8.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account (marsup) than the most recent previously approved version (devinivy) on 2023-02-11. It has since remained available on npm for 1256 days without being unpublished, which is inconsistent with an account takeover — those are typically removed by npm shortly after discovery.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.