@harness-engineering/types
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): Package has 17 versions and 3 approved-dep edges; 0.0.0 is a stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 27 of 27)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.25.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.24.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.23.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.22.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.21.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.20.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.14.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.13.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.12.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.11.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.10.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.10.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.9.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.9.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.9.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.8.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.8.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.7.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.6.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.5.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.4.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.3.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.3.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.2.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 1 |
v0.25.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.23.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.22.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.21.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.20.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (intense.visions) on 2026-07-10, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.