@hashflow/sdk
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@hashflow/hashverse-contracts | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped package; likely used transitively or as a type-only dep rather than directly imported. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Org-internal SDK; missing repo URL and sparse README are metadata gaps, not spam indicators, given 72 published versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.3.8 | 5 / 19 | |
| 2.3.7 | 5 / 19 | |
| 2.3.6 | 5 / 19 | |
| 2.3.5 | 5 / 19 |
v2.3.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.