@hasna/servers
Server management for AI coding agents — CLI + MCP server
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/mcp/index.js | AI (source-diff): Bun-bundled MCP server binary; build script confirms bun build output, not injected dropper code. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:semver | AI (typosquat): Scoped package @hasna/servers is a CLI/MCP server tool, not a typosquat of semver; edit distance match is coincidental. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:zod | AI (phantom-deps): Bun-bundled output; deps may not appear as direct imports in source but are legitimately used. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:commander | AI (phantom-deps): Bun-bundled output; deps may not appear as direct imports in source but are legitimately used. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@hasna/cloud | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped dep; phantom-dep heuristic unreliable for bundled packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.8 | 7 / 3 | |
| 0.1.7 | 7 / 3 | |
| 0.1.6 | 7 / 3 | |
| 0.1.5 | 7 / 3 | |
| 0.1.4 | 7 / 3 | |
| 0.1.3 | 7 / 3 | |
| 0.1.2 | 7 / 3 | |
| 0.1.1 | 7 / 3 | |
| 0.1.0 | 7 / 3 |
v0.1.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.7
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.6
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.5
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.4
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.