@hazae41/latrine
Secure and private WalletConnect client
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@hazae41/jsonrpc | AI (dependencies): Same-author @hazae41 namespace dep; consistent with publisher's approved package history. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.1.5 | 7 / 5 | |
| 2.1.4 | 7 / 6 | |
| 2.1.3 | 6 / 6 | |
| 2.1.2 | 6 / 6 | |
| 2.1.1 | 6 / 6 | |
| 2.1.0 | 6 / 6 | |
| 2.0.0 | 6 / 6 |
v2.1.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.