@hed-hog/api-pagination
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@hed-hog/api-prisma | AI (phantom-deps): Same org scope; likely a peer/optional dep pattern for this monorepo package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@nestjs/mapped-types | AI (phantom-deps): Referenced in config files per finding; stable false positive for this NestJS utility package. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.7 | 8 / 0 | |
| 0.0.5 | 8 / 0 | |
| 0.0.4 | 8 / 0 | |
| 0.0.3 | 8 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 8 / 0 |
v0.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.