@heliosjs/aws
Aws lambda support for @heliosjs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from manual publish to GitHub Actions CI/CD; confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation on same repo. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:qs | AI (typosquat): Scoped package @heliosjs/aws; Levenshtein match to 'qs' is coincidental, not a typosquat. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:ajv | AI (typosquat): Scoped package @heliosjs/aws; Levenshtein match to 'ajv' is coincidental, not a typosquat. | ai |
Versions (showing 45 of 45)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 9.0.10 | 1 / 0 | |
| 9.0.9 | 1 / 0 | |
| 9.0.8 | 1 / 0 | |
| 9.0.7 | 1 / 0 | |
| 9.0.6 | 1 / 0 | |
| 9.0.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 9.0.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 9.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 9.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 8.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 7.0.10 | 1 / 0 | |
| 7.0.9 | 1 / 0 | |
| 7.0.8 | 1 / 0 | |
| 7.0.7 | 1 / 0 | |
| 7.0.6 | 1 / 0 | |
| 7.0.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 7.0.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 7.0.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 7.0.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 7.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 7.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 6.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 5.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.0.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.0.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.0.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.0.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.3.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.3.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.3.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.2.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.12 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.11 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.10 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.9 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.8 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.7 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.3 | 1 / 0 |
v9.0.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.