@helium/blockchain-api

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.

This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (nhelium) on 2026-03-24, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (nhelium) on 2026-03-19, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (nhelium) on 2026-03-17, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (bryhelium) than the most recent previously approved version (nhelium) on 2026-02-27, but bryhelium is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (bryhelium) than the most recent previously approved version (nhelium) on 2026-02-25, but bryhelium is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (nhelium) than the most recent previously approved version (bryhelium) on 2026-01-21, but nhelium is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (nhelium) than the most recent previously approved version (bryhelium) on 2026-01-20, but nhelium is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (nhelium) than the most recent previously approved version (bryhelium) on 2026-01-15, but nhelium is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (nhelium) than the most recent previously approved version (bryhelium) on 2026-01-13, but nhelium is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (nhelium) than the most recent previously approved version (bryhelium) on 2026-01-12, but nhelium is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.