@helsenorge/refero
Refero is a library that uses a fhir r4 schema and creates a interactive form using helsenorge packages.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:assets/fhirpath-rpc.worker-Bu9c994N.js | AI (source-diff): Minified fhirpath web worker bundle; content matches package purpose and is covered by SLSA provenance attestation. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI/CD publisher with SLSA attestation; legitimate supply chain improvement. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:assets/fhirpath-rpc.worker-CpQJKvK6.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled fhirpath Web Worker; minified build artifact explicitly exported in package.json, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@helsenorge/core-utils | AI (dependencies): First-party helsenorge utility package; stable dependency across versions of this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:fhirpath | AI (dependencies): fhirpath is a well-known FHIR path evaluation library; expected dep for this FHIR form package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:uuid | AI (phantom-deps): uuid is a declared runtime dep; phantom-dep heuristic fires on config-only references, not a real concern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:marked | AI (phantom-deps): marked is a declared runtime dep; phantom-dep heuristic fires on config-only references, not a real concern. | ai |
Versions (showing 17 of 17)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 24.0.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 24.0.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 24.0.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 23.4.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 23.3.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 23.3.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 23.2.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 23.2.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 23.1.3 | 6 / 0 | |
| 23.1.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 23.1.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 23.0.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 22.4.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 22.2.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 21.3.1 | 8 / 0 | |
| 21.3.0 | 8 / 0 | |
| 21.2.0 | 8 / 0 |
v24.0.2
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v24.0.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v24.0.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v23.4.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v23.3.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v23.3.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v23.2.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v23.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v23.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v23.1.2
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v23.1.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v23.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v22.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v22.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v21.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v21.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v21.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.