@heroui/use-image
React hook for progressing image loading
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): HeroUI monorepo packages consistently lack provenance; not a risk signal for this package family. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.1.14 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.1.13 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.1.12 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.1.11 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.1.10 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.1.9 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.1.8 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.1.3 | 2 / 0 |
v2.1.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.