@hey-api/client-fetch

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2025-02-27, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2025-02-05, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2025-02-02, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2025-01-30, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2025-01-27, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2025-01-21, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2025-01-14, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2025-01-06, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-12-19, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-12-18, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-12-17, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-12-12, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-12-12, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-12-06, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-12-05, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-11-25, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-11-18, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-11-10, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-10-13, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-10-11, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-09-27, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-09-26, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-09-25, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-09-22, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-09-19, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-09-17, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-08-12, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-08-10, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-08-07, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-08-06, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-08-01, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-08-01, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-07-31, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (lmenus) were replaced by new maintainers (mrlubos). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (mrlubos) than the most recent previously approved version (lmenus) on 2024-07-26, but mrlubos is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.