@hh.ru/magritte-common-data-provider
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal scoped package from hh.ru; missing metadata is typical for org-internal libraries, not spam. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Consistent pattern across hh.ru/magritte-* packages; not a malice indicator. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance is common; no other risk signals present. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.3.6 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.3.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.3.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.3.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.3.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.3.1 | 2 / 0 |
v1.3.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.