@hh.ru/magritte-ui-link
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Consistent with hhru monorepo package style; not a risk signal for this org. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance is consistent across all hhru packages; not a differentiating risk signal. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal UI component from established hhru org; missing metadata is a known pattern for their scoped packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@hh.ru/magritte-design-tokens | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep; phantom-dep heuristic is a stable false positive for this package family. | ai |
v7.1.21
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.1.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.1.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.1.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.