@hh.ru/magritte-ui-picker-wheel
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Monorepo component package; sparse metadata is expected across the entire @hh.ru/magritte-* suite. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@hh.ru/magritte-design-tokens | AI (phantom-deps): Internal sibling dep used transitively via CSS/tokens; phantom-dep heuristic is a stable false positive here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@hh.ru/magritte-ui-typography | AI (phantom-deps): Internal sibling dep; same false-positive pattern as design-tokens. | ai |
v2.1.52
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.