@hh.ru/magritte-ui-tag
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Consistent across all hhru/magritte packages; org does not use Sigstore provenance attestation. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Consistent across all @hh.ru/magritte-* packages; not a malware signal. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Monorepo UI component; sparse metadata is consistent across all 118 versions of this design system package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@hh.ru/magritte-design-tokens | AI (phantom-deps): Same org scope; likely used transitively or in CSS/type declarations rather than direct JS imports. | ai |
Versions (showing 43 of 43)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.3.9 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.3.8 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.3.7 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.3.6 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.3.5 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.3.4 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.3.3 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.3.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.3.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.3.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.2.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.2.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.2.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.1.10 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.1.9 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.1.8 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.1.7 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.1.6 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.1.5 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.1.4 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.1.3 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.1.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.1.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.1.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.0.10 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.0.9 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.0.8 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.0.7 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.0.6 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.0.5 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.0.4 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.0.3 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.0.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.0.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 5.0.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 4.0.26 | 4 / 0 | |
| 4.0.25 | 4 / 0 | |
| 4.0.24 | 4 / 0 | |
| 4.0.23 | 4 / 0 | |
| 4.0.22 | 4 / 0 | |
| 4.0.21 | 4 / 0 | |
| 4.0.20 | 4 / 0 | |
| 4.0.17 | 4 / 0 |
v5.3.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.3.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.3.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.3.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.3.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.3.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.3.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.26
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.25
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.23
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.21
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.20
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.