@hivehub/synap
Official TypeScript/JavaScript SDK for Synap - High-Performance In-Memory Key-Value Store & Message Broker
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@hivehub/thunder | AI (dependencies): First-party sibling package in same org/scope, not a third-party unknown dep. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): No behavioral evidence; publish env change alone isn't malicious. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Publisher has clean 5/5 approval history; no compromise indicators. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.3.0 | 3 / 12 | |
| 1.2.3 | 3 / 12 | |
| 1.2.0 | 3 / 12 | |
| 1.0.0 | 3 / 11 | |
| 0.12.0 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.11.1 | 3 / 11 | |
| 0.11.0 | 3 / 11 | |
| 0.9.0 | 2 / 11 |
v1.3.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (andrehrf) on 2026-07-21, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.2.3
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (andrehrf) on 2026-07-20, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.2.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: andrehrf.
v1.0.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: andrehrf.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: andrehrf.