@hono/oauth-providers
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Established @hono scoped package; empty dist is pre-build artifact, missing metadata is cosmetic. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.8.5 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.8.4 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.8.3 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.8.2 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.8.1 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.8.0 | 0 / 6 |
v0.8.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.8.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.8.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.8.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.