@horuzhenko/protocol
Общие типы и схемы валидации для MCP Guacamole
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.0.11 | 1 / 3 | |
| 6.0.10 | 1 / 3 | |
| 6.0.9 | 1 / 3 | |
| 6.0.8 | 1 / 3 | |
| 6.0.3 | 1 / 3 | |
| 6.0.2 | 1 / 3 | |
| 6.0.0 | 1 / 3 |
v6.0.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.0.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.0.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.0.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.