@hpke/common
A Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) internal-use common module for @hpke family modules.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
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Versions (showing 16 of 16)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.10.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.10.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.9.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.8.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.8.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.7.3 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.7.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.7.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.7.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.6.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.6.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.5.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.4.3 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.4.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.4.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.4.0 | 0 / 3 |
v1.7.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.7.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.0
1 findingThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
v1.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.