@huaweicloud/huaweicloud-sdk-codeartside
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Huawei Cloud SDK org consistently publishes without Sigstore provenance; stable pattern across all their packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.1.199 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.1.198 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.1.197 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.1.196 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.1.195 | 1 / 2 |
v3.1.199
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.198
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.197
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.196
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.195
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.