@huggingface/tokenizers
🤗 Tokenizers.js: A pure JS/TS implementation of today's most used tokenizers
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from xenova (HuggingFace contributor) to GitHub Actions CI/CD is a legitimate, security-improving automation change, confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation on the same version. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.3 | 0 / 15 | |
| 0.1.2 | 0 / 15 | |
| 0.1.1 | 0 / 15 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 15 | |
| 0.0.6 | 0 / 15 | |
| 0.0.5 | 0 / 15 | |
| 0.0.4 | 0 / 15 | |
| 0.0.3 | 1 / 15 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 14 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 14 |
v0.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.