@hydrooj/utils
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): SLSA provenance attestation present; publisher has prior approved record; no code changes from prior version. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Dynamic require is scoped to pm2 binary path resolution; not user-controlled arbitrary module loading. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@hydrooj/register | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org package used as a runtime registration hook; phantom-dep heuristic is a false positive here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:cac | AI (phantom-deps): CLI utility dep; phantom-dep heuristic likely fires due to indirect/config-level usage. | ai |
Versions (showing 21 of 21)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.5.6 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.5.5 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.5.4 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.5.3 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.5.2 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.5.1 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.5.0 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.4.37 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.4.36 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.4.35 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.4.33 | 9 / 1 | |
| 1.4.32 | 9 / 1 | |
| 1.4.31 | 9 / 1 | |
| 1.4.30 | 9 / 1 | |
| 1.4.29 | 9 / 1 | |
| 1.4.28 | 9 / 1 | |
| 1.4.27 | 9 / 1 | |
| 1.4.26 | 9 / 1 | |
| 1.4.25 | 9 / 1 | |
| 1.4.24 | 9 / 1 | |
| 1.4.23 | 9 / 1 |
v1.5.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.37
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (undefinedmoe) on 2025-10-19, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.4.33
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.32
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.31
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.30
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.29
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.28
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.27
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.26
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.25
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.23
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.