@hyperbitjs/chains
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index.cjs | AI (source-diff): Vite-minified bundle of crypto chain definitions; content is readable and benign, not obfuscated. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.2 | 0 / 10 | |
| 2.0.1 | 0 / 10 | |
| 2.0.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.10.2 | 0 / 9 |
v2.0.2
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.10.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.