@iconify-solid/flag
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@iconify/css-solid | AI (phantom-deps): Iconify ecosystem CSS companion package; declared as dependency for consumers, not imported directly in source. Stable false positive for this package. | ai |
v1.0.3
2 findingsDeclared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.1
2 findingsDeclared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
2 findingsDeclared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.