@iconify-vue/wi
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:pg | AI (typosquat): Scoped icon package; Levenshtein match to 'pg' is a false positive. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:qs | AI (typosquat): Scoped icon package; Levenshtein match to 'qs' is a false positive. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:joi | AI (typosquat): Scoped icon package; Levenshtein match to 'joi' is a false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@iconify/css-vue | AI (phantom-deps): Config-file reference in an icon library is expected; not a real phantom dep concern. | ai |
v1.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.