@idlebox/ignore-edit MIT 33 versions

@idlebox/ignore-edit

npm Repository Homepage

api for modify .*ignore files

33

Versions

MIT

License

No

Install Scripts

Verified

Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures No source commit

Maintainers

gongt

Keywords

gitignoreignorefile

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

Source	Rule	Reason	Accepted by	When
provenance	publisher-changed	AI (provenance): Transition from manual publish (gongt) to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA attestation; legitimate automation handoff.	ai	2026/05/20

Versions (showing 33 of 33)

Version	Deps	Published
0.0.33	2 / 2	2026-06-03
0.0.32	2 / 2	2026-05-29
0.0.31	2 / 2	2026-04-30
0.0.30	2 / 2	2026-04-13
0.0.29	2 / 2	2026-04-03
0.0.28	2 / 2	2026-04-03
0.0.27	2 / 2	2026-04-02
0.0.26	2 / 2	2026-04-01
0.0.25	2 / 3	2026-03-29
0.0.24	2 / 3	2026-03-29
0.0.23	2 / 3	2026-03-28
0.0.22	2 / 3	2026-03-28
0.0.21	2 / 3	2026-03-26
0.0.20	2 / 3	2026-03-21
0.0.19	2 / 3	2026-03-21
0.0.18	2 / 3	2026-03-20
0.0.17	2 / 3	2026-03-20
0.0.16	2 / 3	2026-03-20
0.0.15	2 / 3	2026-03-20
0.0.14	2 / 3	2026-03-19
0.0.13	2 / 3	2026-03-03
0.0.12	2 / 3	2026-01-17
0.0.11	2 / 3	2025-09-25
0.0.10	2 / 3	2025-08-30
0.0.9	2 / 3	2025-08-30
0.0.8	2 / 0	2025-08-20
0.0.7	2 / 4	2025-08-19
0.0.6	2 / 5	2025-08-08
0.0.5	2 / 5	2025-08-05
0.0.4	2 / 5	2025-08-03
0.0.3	2 / 5	2025-07-28
0.0.2	2 / 5	2025-07-23
0.0.1	2 / 5	2025-07-23

v0.0.33

1 finding

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.32

1 finding

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.31

1 finding

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.30

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: gongt → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.29

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: gongt → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-03) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.28

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: gongt → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-03) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.27

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: gongt → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-02) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.26

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: gongt → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-01) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.25

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: gongt → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-29) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.24

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: gongt → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-29) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.23

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: gongt → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-28) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.22

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: gongt → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-28) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.21

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: gongt → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-26) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.20

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: gongt → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-21) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.19

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: gongt → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-21) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.18

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: gongt → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-20) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.17

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: gongt → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-20) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.16

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: gongt → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-20) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.15

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: gongt → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-20) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.14

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: gongt → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-19) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.13

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.12

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.11

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.10

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.9

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.8

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.7

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.6

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.5

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.4

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.3

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.2

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.1

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.