@ifc-lite/ids
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@ifc-lite/data | AI (phantom-deps): Same org scope; likely consumed transitively or via monorepo tooling rather than direct import. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:qs | AI (typosquat): Scoped BIM/IFC package; Levenshtein match to 'qs' is purely coincidental with no impersonation intent. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@xmldom/xmldom | AI (phantom-deps): @xmldom/xmldom is a declared runtime dependency; phantom-dep heuristic misfires for packages used indirectly or via config. | ai |
Versions (showing 34 of 34)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.15.33 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.15.32 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.15.31 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.15.30 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.15.29 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.15.2 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.15.1 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.14.11 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.14.10 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.14.9 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.14.8 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.14.7 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.14.6 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.14.5 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.14.4 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.14.3 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.14.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.14.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.14.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.13.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.11.5 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.11.4 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.11.3 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.11.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.11.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.11.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.10.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.9.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.8.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.7.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.6.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.6.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.5.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 2 |
v1.15.33
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.15.32
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.15.31
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.15.30
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.15.29
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (louistrue) on 2026-07-10, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.