@ifi/pi-plan
Planning mode extension for pi with persistent plan files, branch-aware planning, and delegated research tasks.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Hardcoded path to a known peer dependency in ~/.bun/install/global; not arbitrary module loading. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance is common (~88% of npm); no other risk signals present to amplify this. | ai |
Versions (showing 16 of 16)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.5.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.5.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.4.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.4.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.4.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.4.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.3.6 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.3.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.3.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.3.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.3.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.3.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.3.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.2.16 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.2.15 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.2.14 | 2 / 0 |
v0.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.