@imengyu/vue3-context-menu
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@imengyu/vue-scroll-rect | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep likely bundled into lib output; not directly imported in source is expected for a pre-built library. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.5.4 | 1 / 17 | |
| 1.5.3 | 1 / 17 | |
| 1.5.2 | 1 / 17 | |
| 1.5.1 | 1 / 17 | |
| 1.5.0 | 1 / 17 | |
| 1.4.9 | 1 / 17 |
v1.5.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.5.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.5.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.