@injectivelabs/olp-proto-ts-v2
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@protobuf-ts/grpcweb-transport | AI (phantom-deps): Proto-ts transport dep declared for downstream consumers; stable false positive for this package type. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.17.6 | 3 / 0 | |
| 1.17.5 | 3 / 0 | |
| 1.17.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 1.17.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 1.17.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 1.17.0 | 3 / 0 |
v1.17.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.17.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.17.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.17.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.17.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.17.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.