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@inlang/paraglide-js

33
Versions
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures No source commit

Maintainers

samuelstroscheininlangbot

Keywords

inlangparaglidejavascript i18ni18nl10ntranslationinternationalizationsveltelocalizationreactvueangularnextjsreact routernext i18nastroastro i18nsolidsolidstarttanstacktanstack routertanstack startrolldownvitevite-pluginrollup-plugin

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher is confirmed legitimate by SLSA/Sigstore attestation on this and future versions. ai
dependencies unvetted-dep:@inlang/sdk AI (dependencies): First-party @inlang org dependency; stable pattern across all versions of this package. ai
dependencies unvetted-dep:@inlang/recommend-sherlock AI (dependencies): First-party @inlang org dependency; stable pattern across all versions of this package. ai

Versions (showing 33 of 33)

Version Deps Published
2.18.2 7 / 15
2.18.1 7 / 15
2.18.0 7 / 15
2.17.0 7 / 15
2.16.1 7 / 15
2.16.0 7 / 15
2.15.3 7 / 15
2.15.2 7 / 15
2.15.1 7 / 15
2.15.0 7 / 15
2.14.1 7 / 15
2.14.0 7 / 15
2.13.2 7 / 15
2.13.1 7 / 15
2.13.0 7 / 15
2.12.0 7 / 15
2.11.0 7 / 15
2.10.0 7 / 15
2.9.1 7 / 15
2.9.0 7 / 15
2.8.0 7 / 15
2.7.2 7 / 15
2.7.1 7 / 15
2.7.0 7 / 15
2.6.0 7 / 15
2.5.0 7 / 15
2.4.0 7 / 15
2.3.2 7 / 17
2.3.1 7 / 17
2.3.0 7 / 17
2.2.0 7 / 18
2.1.0 7 / 18
2.0.13 7 / 18

v2.18.2

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.18.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.18.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.16.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: samuelstroschein → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-24) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.16.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: samuelstroschein → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-14) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.15.3

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: samuelstroschein → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-08) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.15.2

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: samuelstroschein → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-07) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.15.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: samuelstroschein → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-20) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.15.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: samuelstroschein → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-12) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.14.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: samuelstroschein → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-12) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.14.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: samuelstroschein → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-09) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.13.2

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: samuelstroschein → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-05) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.13.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: samuelstroschein → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-02) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.13.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: samuelstroschein → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-26) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.12.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: samuelstroschein → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-15) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.11.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: samuelstroschein → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-11) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.10.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: samuelstroschein → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-01) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.9.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: samuelstroschein → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-20) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.9.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: samuelstroschein → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-14) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.8.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: samuelstroschein → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-09) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.7.2

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: samuelstroschein → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-07) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.7.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.7.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.6.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v2.5.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v2.4.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: inlangbot → samuelstroschein (on 2025-09-26) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.3.2

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: inlangbot → samuelstroschein (on 2025-09-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.3.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: inlangbot → samuelstroschein (on 2025-09-12) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.3.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: inlangbot → samuelstroschein (on 2025-09-10) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.2.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: samuelstroschein → inlangbot (on 2025-07-01) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.1.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v2.0.13

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.