@instructure/platform-assignment-review
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:i18next | AI (phantom-deps): Declared in dependencies and used via config; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:react-i18next | AI (phantom-deps): Declared in dependencies and used via config; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:dompurify | AI (phantom-deps): dompurify is a direct runtime dependency in package.json; false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.0 | 4 / 13 | |
| 0.2.0 | 6 / 12 | |
| 0.1.0 | 6 / 12 | |
| 0.0.1 | 5 / 12 |
v0.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.