@instructure/platform-message-students-modal
2
Versions
—
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
No SLSA provenance
npm registry signatures
No source commit
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
instuiciplatform-ui-cikristofkulcsarchristopher.sotobalzss
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change reflects CI/CD migration within Instructure org; stable pattern for this scoped package. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainer is within the Instructure org; consistent with internal team management. | ai |
v0.2.2
2 findings
HIGH
Publisher changed: platform-ui-ci → GitHub Actions (on 2026-05-22)
provenance
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
LOW
No provenance attestation
provenance
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 finding
LOW
No provenance attestation
provenance
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.