@instructure/ui-badge
A badge component
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): SLSA Sigstore attestation present; missing gitHead is a minor CI config change, not a supply chain risk for this established monorepo. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): prop-types is a well-known React ecosystem package; @instructure/ui-testable is a same-org monorepo dep. Both are low risk. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of previous maintainer consistent with org-level transition, not a takeover signal given SLSA provenance. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Legitimate org maintainer rotation within Instructure; consistent with CI/CD migration pattern. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publisher with SLSA attestation; consistent with org-wide CI/CD migration for Instructure packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@instructure/ui-testable | AI (dependencies): Same-org @instructure scoped package pinned to matching version; consistent with monorepo release pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@instructure/ui-color-utils | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo dep; declared-but-not-directly-imported is a stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 15 of 15)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 11.7.3 | 8 / 5 | |
| 11.7.2 | 7 / 6 | |
| 11.7.1 | 7 / 6 | |
| 11.7.0 | 7 / 6 | |
| 11.6.0 | 7 / 6 | |
| 11.5.0 | 7 / 6 | |
| 11.4.0 | 7 / 6 | |
| 11.3.0 | 7 / 6 | |
| 11.2.0 | 7 / 6 | |
| 11.0.1 | 7 / 6 | |
| 11.0.0 | 7 / 6 | |
| 10.30.0 | 9 / 6 | |
| 10.29.0 | 9 / 6 | |
| 10.26.4 | 9 / 6 | |
| 10.26.3 | 9 / 6 |
v11.7.3
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.7.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.7.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.6.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v10.30.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.29.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.26.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.26.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.