@instructure/ui-expandable
A utility component for show/hide functionality
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): SLSA provenance attestation present; gitHead absence is cosmetic for this well-established monorepo package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): New deps are same-org @instructure/* packages at matching pinned version — standard monorepo release pattern. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of mstarkman alongside org-wide maintainer update is consistent with legitimate team transition. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Instructure org migrated to GitHub Actions CI publishing; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate automated release pipeline. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers are all @instructure org members; consistent with org-level team expansion. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@instructure/ui-testable | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scope; declared for downstream consumers, not directly imported in this component. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@instructure/ui-testable | AI (dependencies): Same-org Instructure UI monorepo dep; stable false positive for this package family. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@instructure/ui-prop-types | AI (dependencies): Same-org Instructure UI monorepo dep; stable false positive for this package family. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@babel/runtime | AI (phantom-deps): Framework-scoped Babel runtime; loaded by convention, not direct import. Stable for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@instructure/shared-types | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org types-only dependency; not directly imported by convention. Stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@instructure/uid | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dependency; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for monorepo packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 15 of 15)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 11.7.3 | 6 / 6 | |
| 11.7.2 | 6 / 6 | |
| 11.7.1 | 6 / 6 | |
| 11.7.0 | 6 / 6 | |
| 11.6.0 | 6 / 6 | |
| 11.5.0 | 6 / 6 | |
| 11.4.0 | 6 / 6 | |
| 11.3.0 | 6 / 6 | |
| 11.2.0 | 6 / 6 | |
| 11.0.1 | 5 / 6 | |
| 11.0.0 | 5 / 6 | |
| 10.30.0 | 8 / 6 | |
| 10.29.0 | 8 / 6 | |
| 10.26.4 | 8 / 6 | |
| 10.26.3 | 8 / 6 |
v11.7.3
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.7.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.7.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.6.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v10.30.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.29.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.26.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.26.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.