@instructure/ui-focusable
A utility used to identify when an element receives focus.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): GitHub Actions CI publish pipeline for this org does not emit gitHead; SLSA provenance attestation provides equivalent supply chain integrity. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of prior maintainer aligns with org-level CI migration; no malicious indicators present. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Bulk maintainer additions are consistent with org-wide team transition for instructure-ui; not indicative of takeover. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Instructure migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA attestation; consistent across the monorepo. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@instructure/ui-view | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo sibling; phantom-dep heuristic is a stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@babel/runtime | AI (phantom-deps): Framework-scoped transitive dep; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@instructure/ui-react-utils | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo sibling; phantom-dep heuristic is a stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@instructure/shared-types | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo sibling; phantom-dep heuristic is a stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 15 of 15)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 11.7.3 | 7 / 5 | |
| 11.7.2 | 7 / 5 | |
| 11.7.1 | 7 / 5 | |
| 11.7.0 | 7 / 5 | |
| 11.6.0 | 7 / 5 | |
| 11.5.0 | 7 / 5 | |
| 11.4.0 | 7 / 5 | |
| 11.3.0 | 7 / 5 | |
| 11.2.0 | 7 / 5 | |
| 11.0.1 | 7 / 5 | |
| 11.0.0 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.30.0 | 8 / 5 | |
| 10.29.0 | 8 / 5 | |
| 10.26.4 | 8 / 5 | |
| 10.26.3 | 8 / 5 |
v11.7.3
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v11.7.1
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.7.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.6.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.5.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.4.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.3.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v10.30.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.29.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.26.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.26.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.