@instructure/ui-i18n
Helper components and utilities for internationalization.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): prop-types and @instructure/ui-prop-types are benign, well-known packages appropriate for this React utility library. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainer ppesti-inst is within the Instructure org; consistent with normal team rotation. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of mstarkman alongside org-level CI migration is consistent with routine maintainer rotation. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Instructure org migrated to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation; this pattern is consistent across their packages. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): SLSA provenance attestation present; gitHead absence is superseded by Sigstore attestation for this org's CI pipeline. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@instructure/ui-utils | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo sibling; phantom-dep heuristic is a stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@instructure/shared-types | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo sibling types package; stable false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 15 of 15)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 11.7.3 | 8 / 6 | |
| 11.7.2 | 8 / 6 | |
| 11.7.1 | 8 / 6 | |
| 11.7.0 | 8 / 6 | |
| 11.6.0 | 8 / 6 | |
| 11.5.0 | 8 / 6 | |
| 11.4.0 | 8 / 6 | |
| 11.3.0 | 8 / 6 | |
| 11.2.0 | 8 / 6 | |
| 11.0.1 | 8 / 6 | |
| 11.0.0 | 8 / 6 | |
| 10.30.0 | 10 / 6 | |
| 10.29.0 | 10 / 6 | |
| 10.26.4 | 10 / 6 | |
| 10.26.3 | 10 / 6 |
v11.7.3
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.7.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.7.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.6.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v10.30.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.29.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.26.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.26.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.