@instructure/ui-truncate-list
A TruncateList component made by Instructure Inc.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): SLSA provenance attestation present; gitHead absence is superseded by Sigstore attestation for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Instructure monorepo migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI; SLSA attestation confirms integrity. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Org-internal maintainer rotation in a large established monorepo; no malicious indicators. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Paired with maintainer-added; consistent with routine org personnel changes. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@instructure/ui-testable | AI (dependencies): Same-org @instructure scoped package; part of the established instructure-ui monorepo. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Large established Instructure UI monorepo; lack of provenance is consistent across all versions. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@instructure/console | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo sibling; phantom-dep heuristic fires on transitive/indirect usage patterns common in this package family. | ai |
Versions (showing 15 of 15)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 11.7.3 | 8 / 7 | |
| 11.7.2 | 8 / 7 | |
| 11.7.1 | 8 / 7 | |
| 11.7.0 | 8 / 7 | |
| 11.6.0 | 8 / 7 | |
| 11.5.0 | 8 / 7 | |
| 11.4.0 | 8 / 7 | |
| 11.3.0 | 8 / 7 | |
| 11.2.0 | 8 / 7 | |
| 11.0.1 | 8 / 7 | |
| 11.0.0 | 8 / 7 | |
| 10.30.0 | 10 / 7 | |
| 10.29.0 | 10 / 7 | |
| 10.26.4 | 10 / 7 | |
| 10.26.3 | 10 / 7 |
v11.7.3
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.7.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.7.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.6.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v10.30.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.29.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.26.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.26.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.