@interfere/types
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@interfere/constants | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep; likely used only in type declarations, not direct runtime imports. Stable FP for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 9.0.2 | 2 / 7 | |
| 9.0.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 8.1.6 | 3 / 7 | |
| 8.1.2 | 3 / 7 | |
| 8.1.1 | 3 / 7 | |
| 8.1.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 1.0.0 | 3 / 7 |
v9.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.1.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.