@inversifyjs/class-validation
InversifyJs class-validator validation package
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@inversifyjs/framework-core | AI (dependencies): Same InversifyJS monorepo, same trusted publisher; stable false positive for this package family. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Inversify monorepo packages consistently lack provenance; stable false positive for this publisher. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.4.2 | 2 / 16 | |
| 3.4.1 | 2 / 16 | |
| 3.4.0 | 2 / 17 | |
| 3.3.0 | 2 / 17 | |
| 3.2.0 | 2 / 17 | |
| 3.1.0 | 2 / 17 | |
| 3.0.0 | 2 / 17 | |
| 2.0.2 | 3 / 17 |
v3.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.