@iota/notarization
WASM bindings for IOTA Notarization - A Data Notarization Framework providing multiple notarization methods. To be used in JavaScript/TypeScript
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | net-exec-file:node/notarization_wasm.js | AI (source-diff): wasm-bindgen generated glue code with fetch polyfill; standard for wasm-pack node builds. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:web/notarization_wasm.js | AI (source-diff): wasm-bindgen generated glue code; standard wasm-pack web build output. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): WASM binary is the package's stated deliverable (WASM bindings library). | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Expected growth from adding compiled wasm build output vs stub initial version. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:api-obfuscation-reflect | AI (semgrep): wasm-bindgen glue code uses Reflect.get for WASM interop; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:new-function-constructor | AI (semgrep): new Function() in wasm-bindgen output is standard for dynamic WASM string evaluation; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.13 | 1 / 18 | |
| 0.1.12 | 1 / 18 | |
| 0.1.11 | 1 / 18 | |
| 0.1.10 | 1 / 18 | |
| 0.1.9 | 1 / 18 | |
| 0.1.8 | 1 / 18 | |
| 0.1.7 | 1 / 18 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v0.1.11
5 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • node/notarization_wasm_bg.wasm • web/notarization_wasm_bg.wasm
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (iota_ci) on 2026-03-30, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.1.10
5 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • node/notarization_wasm_bg.wasm • web/notarization_wasm_bg.wasm
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (iota_ci) on 2026-03-03, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.1.9
5 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • node/notarization_wasm_bg.wasm • web/notarization_wasm_bg.wasm
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (iota_ci) on 2026-01-19, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.1.8
5 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • node/notarization_wasm_bg.wasm • web/notarization_wasm_bg.wasm
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (iota_ci) on 2025-12-18, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.1.7
5 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • node/notarization_wasm_bg.wasm • web/notarization_wasm_bg.wasm
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (iota_ci) on 2025-11-26, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.