@ironsoftware/ironpdf
IronPDF for Node
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): Expected for a native PDF engine wrapper that spawns platform-specific binaries. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Resolves platform-specific engine package by OS/arch name; not user-controlled input. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@jimp/types | AI (phantom-deps): Transitive type dependency of jimp; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/unzipper | AI (phantom-deps): Type-only package for unzipper; framework-scoped, stable false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2026.6.1 | 7 / 12 | |
| 2026.5.1 | 7 / 12 | |
| 2025.12.2 | 8 / 11 | |
| 2025.11.2 | 8 / 10 |
v2026.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2025.12.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2025.11.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.