@ixo/surveys
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Change reflects move to CI/CD publishing, not account compromise. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Consistent with CI/CD migration, not a takeover pattern. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Consistent with CI/CD migration, not a takeover pattern. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Common for this publisher/org; no other risk signals present. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.0 | 7 / 7 | |
| 0.2.0 | 7 / 7 | |
| 0.1.0 | 7 / 7 | |
| 0.0.2 | 7 / 7 | |
| 0.0.1 | 7 / 7 |
v0.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.